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INTRODUCTION
Gun violence is a growing public health crisis in the United States.
In 2017, nearly 40,000 people were fatally shot, the highest recorded
number since the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began
tracking this data fifty years ago.2 Though the data on firearm injuries is
not as reliable, approximately 115,000 individuals are nonfatally wounded
by firearms in a year.3 These tragic injuries and fatalities alone are enough
to justify public concern, yet they still fail to capture the full scope of harm
caused by gun violence. Frequently overlooked examples include individuals
suffering from lead poisoning associated with bullet fragments that could not
be extracted and children suffering from trauma and post-traumatic stress
by exposure to shootings.' Research now suggests the likelihood of knowing
a gun violence victim within a social network is approximately 99.85%,
regardless of race, ethnicity, or social class.
Despite increasing gun violence in this country, and the consistent
media coverage of high profile mass shootings, firearm regulations have
been particularly difficult to pass.6 In other areas of public health, such
as tobacco and lead paint, when the legislature is unable or unwilling to
1 Web-Based Irjury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS): Explore Fatal Irjury Data
Visualization Tool, CDC, https://wisqars-viz.cdc.gov:8006/explore-data/home (select
"2017" for the "From" and "To" fields, then select "Explore Data" button).
2 Sarah Mervosh, Nearly 40,000 People Died From Guns in US. Last ear, Highest in 50 Years,
N.Y TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://wwwnytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/gun-deaths.
html.
3 See Facts and Figures, U.C. DAVIs HEALTH, https://health.ucdavis.edu/what-you-can-do/
facts.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2020). The CDC recently pulled the data for 2016 and
later due to a concern that the data was unreliable. SeeA More Complete Picture: The Contours
of Gun Irjury in the United States, EVERYTOWN (Nov. 11, 2019), https:/ /everytownresearch.
org/a-more-complete-picture-the-contours-of-gun-injury-in-the-united-states/. Part
of the concern was over the drastic increases in firearm injuries over those recent years.
See Sean Campbell & Daniel Nass, The CDC's Gun Irjury Data Is Becoming Even More
Unreliable, TRACE (Mar. 11, 2019), https://wwwthetrace.org/2019/03/cdc-nonfatal-
gun-injuries-update/. For example, the estimates for firearm injuries in 2017 range
from 31,000 to 236,000. Id.
4 See Michael R. Ulrich, A Public Health Law Path fir Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 71
HASTINGS LJ. 1053, 1087-88 (2020) (describing a broader understanding of gun
violence beyond fatalities).
5 Bindu Kalesan et al., Gun Violence in Americans' Social Network During Their Lifetime, 93
PREVENTIVE MED. 53, 55 tbl.1 (2016).
6 See Why It's More Dfficult to Change Gun Policy in the US. than in New ,ealand, NPR (Mar.
21, 2019), https://wwwnpr.org/2019/03/21/705594544/why-its-more-difficult-to-
change-gun-policy-in-the-u-s-than-in-new-zealand (explaining some of the reasons it
is difficult to pass national gun regulations, even after mass shootings).
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make regulatory adjustments to protect the public, advocates have used
the strategy of litigation as a regulatory tool.' Courtroom victories and the
pressure of lawsuits have generated change in industries that have been
harmful to public health and safety.8 But such a strategy has been difficult
when it comes to gun litigation. The Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act (PLCAA) protects firearm manufacturers and sellers from civil
liability actions," thereby preventing the need for the industry to improve
safety standards or alter sales practices.
Liability litigation, however, is not the only avenue for generating
change. Constitutional litigation focused on the scope of Second Amendment
protections has the possibility to significantly alter the legal landscape for
gun control in the coming years. Our understanding of what protections
the Second Amendment affords is, relatively speaking, new and still largely
undefined. The boundaries and privileges the right provides to individuals
are still yet to be determined. While the fight over the militia clause has
waned, the debate still focuses most often on historical interpretations and
guidance from other areas of more established jurisprudence. The legal
community and the judiciary rarely discuss the public health impact of an
expansive interpretation of Second Amendment rights. What this leaves is a
debate without all the relevant information.
This article argues that the public health and legal community,
using literature studying firearms and the impact of laws on gun violence,
can help to fill this void by viewing Second Amendment constitutional
litigation as an opportunity to educate the judiciary. While research data will
not be dispositive in most cases, it can help create a more thorough ruling
that better understands the context in which these seemingly narrow legal
decisions are made. There is strong evidence to suggest that the judiciary
can be educated through social science and, thereby, influenced in their
legal analysis.' 1 Justices are more likely to turn to social science in prominent
cases of controversy, " of which Second Amendment cases would assuredly
qualify. Moreover, the judiciary is more likely to take amicus briefs seriously
when presented by expert, reliable sources.
7 See Wendy E. Parmet & Richard A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 437, 437 (2000) (describing the increase in using litigation as a
public health tool, including areas of tobacco and lead paint).
8 Id at 439 (discussing the success of tobacco litigation encouraging public health
advocates to use a similar strategy in other areas).
9 See 15 U.S.C § 7902 (2018).
10 See infra Part II.
11 William D. Blake, "Don't Confuse Me with the Facts": The Use and Misuse of Social Science on
the United States Supreme Court, 79 MD. L. REV. 216, 252 (2019).
12 See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine
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A consensus has emerged amidst the tragic events that have
continuously unfolded in the United States over the last several years. As
one mass shooting has led to another, a call to recognize gun violence as
a public health problem has become the norm." Those in public health
may have recognized this need for years, but large portions of the public,
community leaders, politicians, and policymakers now join them. It is time
for the judiciary to do the same.
Second Amendment rights, however they are ultimately defined,
are not absolute. Thus, regardless of the fact that the Amendment protects
the right to keep and bear arms, the courts must consider this right in
conjunction with the state's interest in limiting those rights to protect the
public. In some cases, the data may suggest a broader authority to limit
Second Amendment rights. But in other areas, it may suggest less authority.
In either case, a better understanding of the role the Second Amendment
decisions will have on gun violence will make these decisions more objective,
more constitutionally precise, and, hopefully, more acceptable to a fiercely
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REv. LITIC. 669, 688 (2008).
13 See, e.g, David Hemenway & Matthew Miller, Public Health Approach to the Prevention of
Gun Violence, 368 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2033 (2013); Mark E. Cichon & Michael Hayes,
Gun Violence Is a Public Health Epidemic, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www
chicagotribune.com/opinion/letters/ct-gun-violence-is-a-public-health-epidemic-
20160325-storyhtml; Richard Gonzales, Gun Violence A Public Health Crisis,' American
Medical Association Says, NPR June 14, 2016), https://wwwnpr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/20 16/06/14/48204161 3/gun-violence-a-public-health-crisis-says-ama; Claire
McCarthy Treat Gun Violence as a Public Health Issue, N.Y TIMES Jan. 10, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/01 / 10/making-gun-use-safer/treat-gun-
violence-as-a-public-health-issue; Alexandra Sowa, Treat Gun Violence Like the Public
Health Epidemic It Is and Lift Research Ban, BALT. SUN (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www
baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-0223-gun-research-20180222-story.
html; Kate Walsh, Gun Violence Is a Public Health Crisis, Bos. GLOBE Jan. 22, 2016),
https://wwwbostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/01 /22/gun-violence-public-health-
crisis/SIWyyNOOMWfgev32cF53AO/storyhtml; Catherine Troisi & Stephen
Williams, Public Health Approach Can Stem Gun Violence, Hous. CHRON. (Feb. 2, 2016),
https: / /wwwhoustonchronicle.com /opinion/outlook/article/Troisi-Williams-Public-
health-approach-can-stem-6802092.php; Dan Diamond, How to Reduce Gun Violence?
Treat It as a Public Health Problem, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2015), https://wwwforbes.com/
sites/dandiamond/2015 / 10/01 /gun-violence-is-a-public-health-problem-heres-
why/#4ebce9364475; Nancy Dodson, Gun Violenceiva Public HealthMenace, too;It'r Ercaped
Our Attention During the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y DAILY NEws June 26, 2020), https://
www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-gun-violence-public-health-menace-too-
20200626-ptjlxh3mfjgbjkcb6budfusrce-storyhtml; Maggie Fox, Gun Control Is a Public
Health Isue, Experts Say, NBC NEws Jan. 5, 2016), https://wwwnbcnews.com/health/
health-news/gun-control-public-health-issue-experts-say-n490846; Sean Palfrey What
a Public HealthApproach to Gun Violence Would Look Like, HUFFINGTON POsT June 17, 2016),
https://wwwhuffpost.com/entry/gun-violence-public-healthb_7605102.
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divided public." Thus, constitutional litigation is an opportunity for the
public health community, in particular, to play a key role in demonstrating
a path forward that properly balances the protections of the individual and
the public, and that is grounded in evidence.
This Article begins in Part I by describing in more detail the
difficulty in regulating firearms through litigation. A case involving an
accidental shooting is examined to show how the PLCAA prevents liability
of gun manufacturers even for overt disregard for increased safety measures,
thus impeding victims or their families from bringing a successful cause of
action. The potential for the judiciary to focus solely on the scope of Second
Amendment protections and their reliance on historical analogues creates
further barriers. Part II examines the informative function of litigation,
which enables a mechanism for educating the judiciary on aspects of a
case that may not have been apparent or for which they may not have the
requisite expertise. Through amicus briefs, courts have been informed of the
critical aspects of cases, including the lived experiences of underrepresented
groups and how constitutional theory has a real-world impact outside of the
courtroom. Finally, Part III will demonstrate how constitutional litigation
opens the door for public health research to play a vital role in determining
the circumstances and degree to which Second Amendment rights may be
limited. Here, it becomes clear that the empirical nature of public health
research may enable a truer understanding of gun violence and the impact
deregulatory constitutional declarations may have on this growing epidemic.
14 See KIn PARKER ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., AMERICA'S COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH GUNS
71 (2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/06/
Guns-Report-FOR-WEBSITE-PDF-6-21.pdf ( inding 51%`/ of surveyed responses said
that it is more important to control gun ownership and 47% said protecting the right
to own guns is more important).
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I. LIMHTVIIONS IN LITIGATION
A. Legislative Blockade
In 2005, Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce
in Arms Act (PLCAA) in response to an effort to regulate the firearms
industry through litigation.5 Evidently stymied in their efforts to pass
desired legislation, some gun control advocates turned instead to the courts
to advance their cause." In addition to liability claims from interested
groups, mayors of large cities and housing authorities brought lawsuits
using innovative legal techniques to prevent consolidation and to maximize
disadvantages for manufacturers." The claims in the causes of action varied
from product liability to negligence to nuisance. While the suits may not
have been successful in court, they put pressure on manufacturers, which
had the potential to change the industry. But this change is specifically what
Congress sought to prevent. According to Congressional findings, the Act
was necessary due to "an abuse of the legal system .... "' Congress's aim
was to prevent the "attempt to use the judicial branch to circumvent the
Legislative branch," thereby limiting the ability to regulate the firearms
industry through litigation.2 "
The PLCAA prevents industry change through litigation by
prohibiting civil liability actions in federal or state court.21 The statute
generally provides immunity for manufacturers and sellers of firearms in
suits that arise from criminal or unlawful use of the products by a third
party.22 This provides broad protection because shooting another individual
15 Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901--03).
16 Parmet & Daynard, supra note 7, at 437.
17 David Kopel, The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Facts & Policy, WASH. POST:




19 See 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(6) (2018). Congress also states that protection of the firearms
industry, for the industry itself and the customers they serve, was a key purpose
for passing the statute: "To preserve a citizen's access to a supply of firearms and
ammunition .... d. 790 1(b)(2).
20 Id § 7901 (a)(8). Congress was focused on preventing judicial action against the
firearm industry aiming to prevent "possible sustaining of these actions by a maverick
judicial officer" that would "expand civil liability in a manner never contemplated
by the framers of the Constitution, by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several
States." Id. 7901(a)(7).
21 Id § 7902(a).
22 Id § 790 1(b)(1).
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nearly always includes an unlawful act. The statute does include some
exceptions, but they are quite narrow."
For example, one exception was argued in a liability claim related
to the Sandy Hook shooting. In Soto v. Bushmaster, the plaintiffs relied on an
exception that relates specifically to the marketing of the product rather
than the product itself. 2 This exception allows for claims to proceed when
a manufacturer or seller knowingly violates a state or federal marketing
law, and when that violation is the proximate cause of the harm.25 The
plaintiffs argued that the manufacturer of the semiautomatic firearm used to
perpetrate the Sandy Hook shooting violated a Connecticut law prohibiting
advertisements that promote or encourage violent, criminal behavior
by marketing the weapon as a means to carry out military-style combat
missions against someone's enemies." Ultimately, the Connecticut Supreme
Court ruled this claim was not blocked by PLCAA, rejecting the defendants'
request for summary judgment."
Conversely, a 2009 case, Adames v. Sheahan, illustrates the extent to
which protections are afforded to manufacturers by the PLCAA. 8 This case
involved the tragic death of Josh Adames, who was shot by his friend Billy
Swan, then thirteen years old.`' Home alone, Billy found three guns that
were inside a box he saw on the top shelf of a closet in his parents' room.
23 See id. § 7903(5).
24 Soto v. Bushmaster, 202 A.3d 262, 272, 274-75 (Conn. 2019).
25 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (allowing claims where a "manufacturer or seller of a
qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale
or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for
which relief is sought .... "). "The term 'qualified product' means a firearm ... or
ammunition, ... or a component part of a firearm or ammunition .... " Id. § 7903(4).
The other exceptions include: (1) an action brought against a transferor convicted
under the Gun Control Act, or a comparable State felony law for conduct that directly
harmed the plaintiff; (2) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment
or negligence per se; (3) an action for breach of contract or warranty; (4) an action for
death, injury, or property damage due directly to a design or manufacture defect when
used as intended or in a foreseeable manner, as long as there was no volitional act that
constituted a criminal offense; and (5) an action or proceeding commenced by the
Attorney General to enforce the Gun Control Act. Id § 7903(5)(a)(i)-(vi).
26 Soto, 202 A.3d 262, 272-74. These include advertisements that promote the weapon
as "the uncompromising choice when you demand a rifle as mission adaptable as you
are," "the ultimate combat weapons system," and use the slogan "Forces of opposition,
bow down. You are single-handedly outnumbered." Id. at 274, 276-78.
27 Id at 324-25. The petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. Remington
Arms Co. v. Soto, 140 S. Ct. 513 (2019).
28 See Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1100 (2009).
29 Id at 745.
30 Id
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Handling a Beretta 92FS handgun, Billy pressed the button that removed
the magazine," believing incorrectly that the gun could not fire without the
magazine. When Josh arrived at Billy's home, Billy showed Josh the Beretta
as the boys began to play." Believing the gun was empty, Billy pointed the
firearm atJosh and pulled the trigger, discharging the gun. The bullet struck
Josh in the stomach, resulting in his tragic death.33
Several available firearm features could have prevented Josh
Adames's death. Experts for the plaintiffs testified that a magazine
disconnect device, a mechanism first invented in 1910 and present in over
300 handgun models at the time, could have prevented the shooting." Even
without a magazine disconnect, experts testified that manufacturers could
make the handgun safer with a loaded chamber indicator that was more
easily visible." This indicator would let the gun user know that a bullet was
still in the chamber despite the absence of a magazine." Wallace Collins,
a firearms and ammunition design and safety expert, testified on behalf of
the plaintiffs that these safety features were "readily available, inexpensive,
and commercially feasible."" Therefore, as the challengers argued, specific
choices by the manufacturer made the firearm more dangerous and more
likely to cause the harm that occurred.
Johns Hopkins School of Public Health Professor Stephen Teret
testified that in a survey of 1,200 respondents, nearly thirty-five percent
either thought that a pistol could not fire after the magazine was removed or
did not know whether it could.38 Importantly, nearly thirty percent of those
unaware that the pistol could fire without the magazine lived in a household
where a firearm was present."' Thus, in Professor Teret's opinion, the lack
of a magazine disconnect caused Josh's death." Beretta's witnesses testified
31 Id
32 Id at 746.
33 Id at 745-46.
34 Id at 748-49. A magazine disconnect device or mechanism "prevents a semiautomatic
pistol that has a detachable magazine from operating to strike the primer of
ammunition in the firing chamber when a detachable magazine is not inserted in the
semiautomatic pistol." Design Safety Standards in Cal ifornia, GIFFORDs L. CTR. (updated
July 28, 2020), https://giffords.org/lawcenter/state-laws/design-safety-standards-in-
california/#footnote_ 11 _16042.
35 Id at 749.
36 Id at 748-50.
37 Id at 749.
38 Id
39 Id
40 Id Professor Teret echoed the other plaintiffs' experts in declaring the chamber-loaded
warning on the Beretta to be ineffective in conveying that the handgun was still loaded
without the magazine. Id.
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that the cost of a magazine disconnect was approximately two percent of
the firearms price and that the primary reason that they chose not to include
one was that there was no market for that feature." Yet, in liability cases, this
evidence matters little due to the immunity granted to manufacturers by the
PLCAA.
Under the PLCAA, the Supreme Court of Illinois had little choice
but to grant summary judgment for Beretta despite these testimonies.
According to the court, there was a "criminal or unlawful misuse" of the
firearm by a third party, regardless of whether Billy had the intent to shoot
Josh.2 The primary concern for the court was that Billy pointed the firearm
at his friend and pulled the trigger." According to the court, this qualified
as a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, removing all possibility
that one of the exceptions to the PLCAA applied." Specifically, despite
affordable solutions" readily available to Beretta, the exception to immunity
for a "defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a
reasonably foreseeable manner," did not apply here.6
This case demonstrates the difficulty in winning a liability claim
against gun manufacturers. The inherent dangerousness and ease with which
the product can cause serious harm appears to be a primary justification for
impeding liability claims. Here, despite being just a child, knowingly pointing
the gun and pulling the trigger is enough to exculpate the manufacturer
for the perilous product they have created. Because of the barrier created
by the PLCAA, even the testimony demonstrating a lack of awareness of
how firearms work and readily available safety features to reduce the risk
of harm was rendered moot.' Under the PLCAA, it is apparent that not
only are manufacturers not liable for the harm caused by their product, be
it purposeful or otherwise, but they are under no obligation to maximize
the safety of their product or to educate their consumers. This legislative
41 Id
42 Id at 761-62 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2006)).
43 Id at 763.




that Billy intended to shoot Josh or understood the ramifications of his conduct. We
disagree. As Beretta argues, even if Billy did not intend to shootJosh, Billy did choose
and determine to point the Beretta at Josh and did choose and determine to pull the
trigger. Although Billy did not intend the consequences of his act, his act nonetheless
was a volitional act. Accordingly, pursuant o the PLCAA, the discharge of the Beretta
in this case was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, which the
PLCAA provides 'shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death,
personal injuries or property damage."').
Id at 749.
Id at 765 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v) (2006)).
Id at 763.
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limitation demonstrates that victims of gun violence need another avenue if
they wish to have influence over the regulation of firearms.
While private actors were limited in their ability to sue for damages,
cities attempted their own litigation strategies.m For example, New York
City filed a claim against firearm suppliers for violating New York's
criminal nuisance statute."' The city claimed manufacturers were knowingly
distributing firearms to legitimate retailers that they knew would be diverted
into illegal markets without making any efforts to prevent this diversion."
According to the city, firearm suppliers refuse to take reasonable steps
available to them, such as monitoring sales, training dealers, or investigating
which distributors have sales that disproportionately end up supplying the
illegal secondary market.51 One of the city's claims for contribution to the
illegal markets was manufacturers purposefully oversupplying firearms in
markets where gun regulations were particularly lax." As a result, New
York sought injunctive relief requiring suppliers to alter their marketing and
distribution practices to effectively minimize these illegal markets."
Ultimately, the city's efforts were unsuccessful. The court determined
that the PLCAA preempted the city's application of its criminal nuisance
statute and that no exception was applied." Applying the statutory canon of
avoiding absurdity, the court stated that allowing this case to move forward
would enable the "exception to swallow the statute, which was intended
to shield the firearms industry from vicarious liability for harm caused by
firearms that were lawfully distributed into primary markets."" Undeterred
48 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 940 A.2d 163, 172 (D.C.
2008) (rejecting the District's attempt to impose strict liability on assault weapons
manufacturers).
49 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 E3d 384, 389-91 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 556 U.S. 1104 (2009).
50 Id. at 391.
51 Id The city asserted various mechanisms for facilitating the movement of legally
distributed handguns into illegal markets: (1) gun shows; (2) private sales, which do not
require background checks or record keeping required by federal firearm licensees;
(3) straw purchases, where qualified individuals purchase firearms for those who are
not qualified; (4) selling multiple firearms at once or in a short period of time; (5)
intentional trafficking by corrupted federal firearm licensees; (6) thefts from licensees
with poor security; and (7) "oversupply of markets where gun regulations are lax." Id
52 Id
53 See id. at 390-91.
54 See id at 390, 399-400. Under the PLCAA, a lawsuit may proceed in "an action
in which a manufacturer or seller ... knowingly violated a State or federal statute
applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms], and the violation was a proximate
cause of the harm .... " 15 USC § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (2018).
55 Beretta, 524 E3d at 403. Conversely the dissent finds the majority's interpretation will in
fact lead to "the sort of practical problems and absurd results we usually try to avoid."
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by concerns of federalism, the court ultimately prevented New York from
applying its laws to manufacturers the city believed contributed to substantial
harm to its citizens.5
B. Judicial Engagement
i. The Use, Misuse, and Absence of Data
While the PLCAA prevents regulating firearms through liability
litigation, constitutional claims implicating the Second Amendment can have
a profound impact on firearm regulations. A broad interpretation of Second
Amendment protections has the potential to strike down existing regulations
and prevent future policies aimed to curb gun violence. Meanwhile, a
narrower reading of the Second Amendment may enable efforts to reduce
gun violence but could also restrict the rights of those seeking to protect
themselves from harm.
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on how lower
courts should decide these critical cases.5 In Heller, the Court made clear
that the Second Amendment provided an individual right to keep and bear
arms, anchored by the right of self-defense.58 Yet the majority opinion gave
hardly any other information on what this meant for existing laws limiting
firearm access.5
Id at 406 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In particular, the dissent
questions the reasoning that while "a statute need not expressly regulate firearms to be
'applicable' to firearms, the majority comes to the conclusion that [criminal nuisance]
is not a statute that 'clearly can be said to regulate the firearms industry' or 'actually
regulate[s] the firearm industry"' Id. (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted). Therefore, the dissent reads the holding to mean that a statute is not
applicable unless and until it is in fact applied to the firearms industry "Unlike, say a
fruit, which is edible long before someone has eaten it, or gasoline which is flammable
even before someone has ignited it, the majority finds that a state law is not applicable
until a state court actually applies it." Id. (citation omitted).
56 Id at 390-91 (majority opinion). The majority held that the only concern with respect
to the Tenth Amendment was whether the federal government was commandeering
the state's authority to act autonomously. Id. at 396. The court ruled commandeering
was not present because "it imposes no affirmative duty of any kind." Id at 397
(quoting Connecticut v. Physicians Health. Senws. of Conn., Inc., 287 E3d 110, 122
(2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 E3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Heller
provides no categorical answer to this case. And in many ways, it raises more questions
58 See District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller ), 554 U.S. 570, 591-92 (2008).
59 Id. at 719-23 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that the majority did not give any
information on how its ruling would impact existing laws).
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Gun violence and gun rights are fiercely debated in the public
discourse, with passionate advocates on each side.60 Most, though,
acknowledge that gun violence is indeed a national problem.61 It is, therefore,
not a question of should we address gun violence, but rather, how do we
address gun violence regulation or increased access to firearms for self-
defense-that provokes emotionally charged responses. While the judiciary
continues to determine the contours of the Second Amendment right, it
is imperative that they do so deliberately and as objectively as possible.
Objectivity in this area may be particularly important to encouraging public
trust in the judiciary's ability to insulate itself from the politics of the issue.
The use of empirical evidence and the growing body of public
health research may provide a useful avenue with which to achieve this goal.
Data cannot necessarily answer a legal question, and in some circumstances,
data may even be lacking or unavailable. But at other times, there may
be data supporting the arguments on each side of a case, a situation that
typically results in deference to the legislature. Emphasizing the relevance
of public health research is not to suggest that it will answer any and all
legal queries. Rather, it provides a more robust understanding of the legal
question. Data can contextualize the legal analysis and provide more
thorough reasoning for the court's ultimate conclusion. Using research that
focuses on the relationship between gun laws and gun violence provides the
judiciary with another important tool for accomplishing a complete analysis
of the constitutionality of any firearm regulation. Yet too many cases tend
to ignore the public health aspects of the issue.
Instead, cases often focus on the scope of the right, ignoring the
harm that an expansive interpretation of Second Amendment protections
may cause. There is some logic to this approach. Heller provided very little
information outside of the fact that the District of Columbia could not ban
individuals from possessing handguns in their homes. The Court's narrow
ruling and reliance on historical analysis to find an individual right has led
some jurists to turn to history for answers.2 But there are limitations to what
history can provide in constitutional analysis, including state authority, to
limit a right in response to a public health crisis.63
To be sure, science and data tell us nothing of the scope of an
amendment's protection. But under the police powers, the state is authorized
60 See KIM PARKER ET AL., supra, note 14.
61 See id. at 53 (showing that only 2% of respondents felt gun violence was not a problem
at all in the United States).
62 See discussion infra, Part I.B.ii.
63 See id.; see also Michael R. Ulrich, Revisionist History? Responding to Gun Violence Under
Historical Limitations, 45 AM.J.L. & MED. 188, 190 (2019).
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to pass laws to protect public health, safety, and welfare.6 Constitutional
rights can and have been limited in the name of public health since the
founding.65 Thus, the public health impact is not only important but
constitutionally relevant. A focus entirely on the right is simply an incomplete
legal analysis. The scope of the right, the degree to which it is infringed,
and the potential benefits to the public are all critical components of a
constitutional evaluation."
Yet some prominent cases have been devoid of an empirical
assessment while coming to conclusions that could have drastic impacts
on gun control and exacerbate the gun violence epidemic. For example,
questions have arisen regarding how to treat Heller's declaration that:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.67
The Sixth Circuit has dismissed Second Amendment claims for those
convicted of felonies, relying almost entirely on this language.S One such case
involved an individual convicted of running an illegal gambling business."'
The Sixth Circuit dispensed the constitutional claim with no analysis of
whether this type of crime is associated with an increased likelihood of
future violence by grounding its opinion on this quote from Heller, where
the Supreme Court said prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was
"presumptively lawful" but provided no explanation or citations to explain
64 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 27 (1905).
65 See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State
in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 267, 285-302 (1993) (describing public
health regulations in the colonial period and founding era); see also Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (declaring the inherent police power as "a portion
of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory
of a State, not surrendered to the general government," including "[i]nspection laws,
quarantine laws, [and] health laws of every description ... "); Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (acknowledging the historical acceptance of police
power authority and "the general and rational principle, that every person ought so to
use his property as not to injure his neighbors; and that private interests must be made
subservient o the general interests of the community") (citation omitted).
66 Ulrich, supra note 4, at 1061.
67 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
68 United States v. Carey 602 E3d 738, 739, 741 (6th Cir. 2010).
69 Id at 739.
70 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
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this conclusion." Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit in 2010 upheld the
statute's application to an individual convicted of robbery, relying in part on
a Note from 1982 that cited recidivism research published in 1979, thirty-
one years prior to its opinion."2
Laws limiting firearms access to the mentally ill received a slightly
more deliberate analysis from the Sixth Circuit in Tyler. Hillsdale County Sherfs
Department." The question there was whether the mentally ill, a designation
established in the federal statute by adjudications of incompetency and
involuntary commitment, may be permanently prohibited from owning
firearms." Unlike the analysis for the permanent ban for felons, the Sixth
Circuit did not take the Heller language to be "an analytical off-ramp to
avoid constitutional analysis."" However, the differing treatment of felons
and the mentally ill do not appear to be based on one being more or less
likely to commit future violence. Instead, the court looked to history, finding
the prohibition of firearm possession by the mentally ill to lack "historical
pedigree."6 Yet, asJudge Moore's dissent in Tyler notes, the ban on possession
by all felons was enacted in 1961, 170 years after the Second Amendment
was ratified and a mere seven years before the ban on the mentally ill."
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the purpose of the statute was
to keep firearms out of the hands of "risky people."8 Yet, after examining
the ban more closely, the majority opinion found that nearly all of the
government's evidence lacked justification for a permanent prohibition for
those who have been involuntarily committed at some point in their life."
The majority even cited a study finding that the rates of violent acts by
those involuntarily committed and the general population in the observed
71 Carey, 602 E3d at 741. The Sixth Circuit's determination in Carey also relies heavily on
its own decision in United States v. Frazier. See 602 E3d at 741-42. In Frazier the Sixth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the felon ban, citing several cases that pre-dated
Heller even though Frazier was decided after Heller. See United States v. Frazier, 314 F
App'x. 801, 807 (6th Cir. 2008).
72 United States N. Williams, 616 E3d 685, 692-93 (7th Cir 2010) (citing Note, Selective
Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism 96 HARv. L. REV. 5 11, 515,
515 n.24 (1982)).
73 Seegenerally Tyler N. Hillsdale Cty Sheriffs Dep't, 837 E3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
74 Id at 681.
75 Id at 686 (citations omitted).
76 Id at 687. According to the court, the limits on the mentally ill are "of 20th Century
vintage" (quoting United States N. Skoien, 614 E3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010)), and lack
"historical evidence" in support. Id
77 See id. at 715-16 (Moore,J., dissenting).
78 Id at 693 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
79 See id. at 694-98.
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community to be statistically indistinguishable." Indeed, the evidence
suggests people with mental illness are no more likely to be violent than
those without mental illnesses.1 In fact, people with mental illnesses are
more likely to be the victims of violence,2 which actually may suggest their
right to self-defense should be more ardently protected.
Still, the majority decided to remand the case to give the government
another chance to meet their burden of proof." Multiple concurring
opinions questioned the validity of offering the government another
opportunity to justify the lifetime ban, and Judge McKeague characterized
the government's evidence as "woefully short of demonstrating the required
reasonable fit""' between the ban and their interests.5 Here the problem is
not necessarily that the court did not engage with research; rather, the Sixth
Circuit did not come to the most logical conclusion in light of the fact that
all of the government's research was deemed insufficient. Again, it is not
that data will necessarily be controlling, but it should be persuasive. And a
cursory discussion of empirical evidence that is not relied upon in reaching
the court's conclusion hardly qualifies as a thorough analysis.
Courts have demonstrated a willingness to disregard data not only as
it relates to limited Second Amendment rights of felons and the mentally ill
but in finding an expansive view of Second Amendment rights as well. Broad
protection of Second Amendment rights can have serious implications that
may adversely affect the public. The right to carry firearms in public offers
one such example. While dangers are present for the individual and those
they live with when a firearm is present in the home, a decision to carry a gun
80 Id at 696 (citing Hem yJ. Steadman et al., Violence by People Dischargedfrom Acute Psychiatric
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
393, 400 (1998)).
81 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T MacLeish, Alental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the
Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 241-42 (2015) (demonstrating
that only about 40,% of violence is attributable to people with mental illnesses). Perhaps
more importantly this fact holds true when looking at harm from firearms. Studies
"show that fewer than 5)% of the 120,000 gun-related killings in the United States
between 2001 and 2010 were perpetrated by people diagnosed with mental illness." Id.
at 241.
82 Id at 242 ("[P]eople diagnosed with schizophrenia have victimization rates 651% to
130% higher than those of the general public.").
83 See Tyler, 837 E3d at 699 (McKeague,J., concurring).
84 Id Judge McKeague also stated, "I agree withJudge Sutton that ... it would be fruitless
to give the government a second bite at the apple .... " Id.
85 Id. at 699; see also id. at 700 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he government has not met its
burden...."); id. at 708 (Sutton,J., concurring) ("[T]he government has not presented
any individualized evidence about Tyler's fitness to possess a gun but instead has relied
on stereotypes about the mentally ill.").
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in public has the potential to increase the risk for others. More importantly,
it creates risk for individuals who have no control over the decision of others
to carry their firearms and, in the case of concealed carry, may have no way
of knowing if and when firearms are present in a public setting.
Yet, in Wrenn . District of Columbia,"6 the D.C. Circuit struck down
a limitation on carrying firearms in public with no reference, citation, or
discussion of what impact this may have on gun violence and the public.'
The case concerned a "good reason" restriction, which required individuals
to demonstrate a need beyond general self-defense to carry a firearm in
public." The District was not trying to eliminate citizens' right to carry
firearms in public completely; rather, it attempted to limit concealed carrying
rights to those who demonstrated a true need for it."' It seems unremarkable
to see this as an attempt to strike a balance between the needs of individuals
for self-defense and the risks to the public."' Consequently, a constitutional
analysis would presumably examine the justification for these restrictions
to determine whether they have a reasonable chance to mitigate risk or
whether they go too far.
But the D.C. Circuit avoided such an analysis completely.3 1
Performing some logical gymnastics, the Circuit Court found the city's
regulation to be a complete ban for those residents who are denied a license
to carry in public, thus falling in line with the complete ban of handguns by
any resident that the Court categorically rejected in Heller.32 The majority
in Wrenn focused entirely on the scope of the right, whereas the dissent
highlighted the relevance of the District's consideration of "vast amounts
86 Wrenn v District of Columbia, 864 E3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
87 Id at 668.
88 Id at 655-56.
89 Id
90 Compare Wrenn, 864 E3d at 667-68, with Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 E3d
81, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny and finding New York's "proper
cause" restriction a proper balance between Second Amendment rights and the State's
authority to protect the public), and Moore v. Madigan, 702 E3d 933, 941 (7th Cir.
2012) (supporting the Second Circuit's analysis in Kachalsky that New York took a
moderate approach to fulfilling its objective to protect the public).
91 Wrenn, 864 E3d at 666 ("[W]e strike down the District's law here apart from any
particular balancing test."). The court did this despite recognizing that "our previous
cases have always applied tiers of scrutiny to gun laws." Id.
92 Id at 665-66. The court ignores the fact that individuals would be able to reapply for
public carry licenses in the future, which would contradict the categorization of the law
as a permanent ban. Moreover, the court declares that Heller prohibits total bans yet,
as discussed above, courts have rather easily accepted lifetime bans for anyone who has
been convicted of a felony, including those that are nonviolent offenses. See supra notes
67-72 and accompanying text.
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of data" that found an "empirical connection between a profusion of guns
and increased violent crime." 3' After declaring the right to carry a firearm
in public a part of the core of Second Amendment protections, the Wrenn
court held that it "would flout [the] lesson of Heller I if we proceeded as
if some benefits could justify laws that necessarily destroy the ordinarily
situated citizen's right to bear common arms."4
The court here explicitly ignored the role of the government
in protecting public health, safety, and welfare. It would be one thing to
consider the evidence and determine that the law simply goes too far.
Perhaps what qualifies as a "good reason" is too narrow, for example. But
the court never weighed any evidence, let alone research considering to what
extent public carry laws minimize or exacerbate gun violence. Regardless
of the outcome, to be so cavalier about regulations aimed at minimizing
the number of firearms in public is troubling. Gun violence is inarguably
a problem and one that should be genuinely engaged with by the judiciary
when considering firearm regulations.
It is worth noting two points about these cases. Although they
are important, they are lower courts and obviously do not set a binding
precedent throughout the country. Moreover, these cases do not represent
the entirety of the Second Amendment landscape among the lower courts,
including the use of empirical evidence. But with little Supreme Court case
law to examine, these lower court cases are illustrative of how courts can
ignore data and relatively easily dispense with state interests or even Second
Amendment protections for certain groups.
It is, therefore, particularly important to understand how the
Supreme CourtJustices may grapple with empirical data or if they will at all.
The litigation of the Supreme Court's most recent Second Amendment case,
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association o. City of New York,35 is demonstrative of
the uncertainty surrounding the Justices' approach. New York City limited
carrying handguns only to shooting ranges within the city limits. 6 The
restriction was challenged as a violation of the Second Amendment, but he
City won in the District and Appellate Courts.7 After the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear the case, however, New York reversed course and
93 W1 renn, 864 E3d at 666, 671 (Henderson, J., dissenting). The majority holds that "we
needn't pause to apply tiers of scrutiny as if strong enough showings of public benefits
could save this destruction of so many commonly situated D.C. residents' constitutional
right to bear common arms for self-defense is any fashion at all." Id. at 666.
94 Id at 665 (emphasis in original).
95 N.Y State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
96 Id at 1530 (Alito,J., dissenting).
97 Id at 1527-28.
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amended the law to appease the challengers and argued the case was moot.,
New York did not fear that the Supreme Court would strike down
the restriction; the fact that the law was amended evidences as much. But
arguing that the case was moot might have been an attempt to forestall an
adverse ruling broad enough to impact other firearm regulations critical to
the fight against gun violence.3" At every judicial level, Second Amendment
rulings define the contours of the solutions available to policymakers. But
the Supreme Court has the power to control all of those cases, and it appears
that some members of the Court are more likely to look backward at the
history of the Second Amendment, rather than forward, when making their
decision. As illustrated below, such a backward-looking approach would be
limiting.
ii. Historical Limitations
McDonald o. City of Chicago1 is the only other Supreme Court case
on the Second Amendment decided since Heller, but other sources provide
insight into the approach certain justices might take."01 Importantly, many
justices seem intent on using history as the primary tool for determining the
constitutionality of gun laws. This approach, however, is misguided because
it limits the influence and importance of social science and ignores the
potential for public health issues to evolve over time, expanding government
authority to act in times of crisis and restricting authority when the risk
has been minimized or eliminated. As our understanding of public health
problems and methods to address them improve over time, the analysis of
state efforts to protect the public should evolve as well. But reliance on history
may create a barrier to a modern, data-driven approach to gun violence.
Given Justice Thomas's numerous dissents from the Court's denials
of certiorari for Second Amendment appeals, his opinion is perhaps the
easiest on the Court to predict in these matters. Justice Thomas has declared
the Second Amendment a "disfavored right" and castigated lower courts
for their "general failure to afford the Second Amendment the respect
due an enumerated right."" More importantly, he rejects lower courts'
98 See id. at 1526 (plurality opinion).
99 Even Justice Alito questions the logic behind the government's change of heart:
'Although the City had previously insisted that its ordinance served important public
safety purposes, our grant of review apparently led to an epiphany of sorts, and the
City quickly changed its ordinance." Id. at 1527-28 (Alito, J., dissenting).
100 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010).
10 1 See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
102 Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas,J., dissenting from the Court's
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use of a two-step inquiry that incorporates the tiers of scrutiny in Second
Amendment cases, finding the test to be "entirely made up" and inconsistent
with Heller's rejection of an interest-balancing inquiry."O Instead, Justice
Thomas appears to prefer that courts follow Heller's suggestion that "courts
could conduct historical analyses for restrictions" that may be analogous to
the current laws that are challenged."1 0' In another dissent, joined by Justice
Gorsuch,Justice Thomas explicitly stated that historical digging into sources
from England, the founding era, the antebellum period, and Reconstruction
helped him determine that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals incorrectly
upheld a firearm restriction.""
Justice Alito took the historical approach in his dissent"' from the
Supreme Court's most recent Second Amendment case, New York State Rifle
& Pistol Association o. City of New York, a case the majority declared moot in
light of recent amendments made to the city's handgun licensing statute."0
After explaining why the case was not moot, Justice Alito stated that the
constitutional question was an easy one to answer using a historical analysis
that showed a lack of analogous laws at the time the Second Amendment
was adopted.0 8
Justice Kavanaugh, a recent appointment to the Court, was equally
explicit in favoring a historical approach to Second Amendment analysis
while a lower court judge on the D.C. Circuit.1"b In the follow-up case to
denial of certiorari).
103 Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1866-67 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104 Id at 1866. While Justice Thomas rejects the two-step inquiry that includes a tiers-of-
scrutiny analysis, he believes that jurists who have "concluded that text, history, and
tradition are dispositive in determining whether a challenged law violates the right to
keep and bear arms" espouse an approach consistent with Heller. Id (citations omitted);
see also Silvester, 138 S. Ct. at 945 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 E3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Peruta
v California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996-98 (2017) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
106 N.Y State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1544 (2020) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
107 Id at 1526 (per curiam).
108 See id. at 1538-42, 1544 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("History provides no support for
a restriction of this type."). Justice Aito states that if history were insufficient to
demonstrate that the law is invalid, then New York City lacks justification for their
restriction. Id at 1541-42. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the dissent except
for the last section analyzing the City's justification. Id at 1527. Justice Kavanaugh
also proclaimed his support for Justice Alito's analysis of Heller and McDonald, while
expressing concern over lower courts improperly applying those cases. Id at 1527
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
109 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller I), 670 E3d 1244, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Justice Kavanaugh also, unsurprisingly, joined Justice
Thomas's most recent dissent from denial of certiorari where Justice Thomas
194
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW
Heller referred to as Heller II then Judge Kavanaugh stated quite clearly
his belief that history is the proper manner in which these regulations should
be evaluated,"1 and he decried the use of any traditional standard of review
as "judge-empowering 'interest-balancing inquir[ies]."'111
Chief Justice Roberts does not have a written opinion discussing
which analytical tools he believes should be used in analyzing Second
Amendment challenges, but there may be hints that he too feels historical
inquiry is the best methodology. During the Heller oral argument, the Chief
Justice questioned the value of the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny standards of
review, instead asking pointedly whether it would be better to simply look to
the past and examine the regulations that were available at the time of the
Amendment's adoption:
[T]hese various phrases under the different standards that are
proposed ... none of them appear in the Constitution; ... Isn't
it enough to determine the scope of the existing right that the
amendment refers to, look at the various regulations that were
available at the time ... and determine how these how this
restriction and the scope of this right looks in relation to those?"2
If implemented, this approach would require the current restriction to be
compared to what was acceptable historically and would avoid balancing
the benefits and burdens of the law, as found in the traditional standards of
review.
The potential for a majority of Supreme Court justices to rely
primarily, if not solely, on a historical inquiry for constitutional analysis is
quite troubling. For one thing, judges are not historians. As Fordham history
professor Saul Cornell has pointed out, both Justice Scalia's and Justice
Stevens's historical analysis in Heller fell short of the standards that historical
scholarship demands." Even Justice Scalia, author of the majority opinion
in Heller, conceded in his concurrence in McDonald that historical analysis is
not necessarily an objective determinant of constitutionality, finding instead
advocated for a historical analysis and used that framework to analyze a restriction to
carry a firearm in public. Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
110 Heller II, 670 E3d at 1295 (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
111 Id at 1277.
112 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). Chief Justice
Roberts, with a hint of disdain for tiers-of-scrutiny went on to state that "these
standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind of developed over the years as
sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked up." Id
113 Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Ue and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 69 OHIo ST. L.J. 625, 626 (2008).
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that "it sometimes requires resolving threshold questions."1 14
Judge Richard Posner took his critique of historical inquiry a step
further, labeling the analysis "law office history."" Given the resources
available to the Supreme Court, Judge Posner believes the Justices are able
to selectively use historical sources to justify nearly any outcome.16 Whether
this is indeed what actually occurs may be less relevant than the perceived
notion that it does. In such a contentious area as Second Amendment rights,
the public perception of the Court's objectivity is paramount, and ignoring
current empirical evidence, especially when available to the public, may
create a tension that strains the public's trust in the Court's ability to avoid
political partisanship.
The reliance on historical analysis, as opposed to current empirical
data, also ignores the manner in which the police powers of the state
authorize the government to be responsive to emerging threats to public
health and safety. If government action is necessary to protect the public,
the police powers enable some regulation of behavior and limitation of
individual rights." A critical part of the analysis, then, is whether the threat
to the public warrants and is amenable to government action and if the
means which would factor in the burden on the individual right are
justified." Without an actual threat to the public or a reasonable chance to
mitigate the potential harm, government action is unwarranted. Empirical
research would be a critical component of this evaluation because it would
help to properly evaluate the nature of a modern public health threat and
the potential for government action to mitigate that threat. This type of
assessment demonstrates the limitation of a historical inquiry, at least in
114 See McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 803-04 (2010) (Scalia,J., concurring).
115 Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 35.
116 Id ("The judge sends his law clerks scurrying to the library and to the Web for bits
and pieces of historical documentation. When the clerks are the numerous and able
clerks of Supreme Court justices, enjoying the assistance of the capable staffs of the
Supreme Court library and the Library of Congress, and when dozens and sometimes
hundreds of amicus curiae briefs have been filed, many bulked out with the fruits of
their authors' own law-office historiography it is a simple matter, especially for a skillful
rhetorician such as Scalia, to write a plausible historical defense of his position.").
117 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-28 (1905) (finding the evaluation of
necessity important to prevent arbitrary and oppressive government action unrelated
to a true public health threat). For a further discussion on Jacobson, see Ulrich, supra note
4, at 1077 (describing the framework used in Jacobson as requiring a public health threat
to justify government action).
118 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30-31 (stating that the vaccine was an effective measure in
addressing smallpox while the government also exempted those who would be overly
burdened due to a medical contraindication).
1 96
VOL. 13, Iss. 1 NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 197
being dispositive for a regulation's constitutionality.""
As the public health and safety threats evolve, diminish, and
emerge over time, so too must the action the government is authorized to
take in response. As gun violence has become a greater threat to society,
especially to communities of color, the state must be empowered to respond.
Individual rights are and have always been a limitation on state action, as
well they should be. But the determination of whether an action qualifies as
a protected right is not the end of a constitutional inquiry if that right can be
limited in a reasonable manner that benefits the greater good. This has been
true since the country's founding.12' But given the risk of abuse inherent in
paternalistic actions in the name of public health, there is logic in questioning
the validity of state action. Indeed, there are plenty of historical examples
of abuse of power in the name of public health.121 Again, this is where data
provides a persuasive, though not necessarily conclusive, manner in which to
evaluate the legitimacy of state action in the name of protecting the public.
119 As Justice Breyer notes in his dissent in Heller, "This historical evidence demonstrates
that a self-defense assumption is the beginning, rather than the end, of any constitutional
inquiry" Heller 1, 554 U.S. at 687 (BreyerJ. dissenting).
120 See Parmet, supra note 65, at 292 (discussing efforts in the early years of the country to
protect public health, and the "relationship between limits on freedom and provision
of care").
121 See e.g., Buck N. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts o justify
forced sterilization on individuals alleged to have insufficient mental capacity in an effort
to "prevent our being swamped with incompetence" by those who "sap the strength of
the State."); Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 E 1, 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (striking down
a San Francisco quarantine ordinance that only applied to people of Chinese descent);
Jew Ho N. Williamson, 103 E 10, 23-24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) ("Though the law itself
be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations, between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.")
(quoting Yick Wo. N. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)); see also Wendy E. Parmet,
AIDS and Quaran tine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 66-68
(1985) (describing health officials using quarantine against prostitutes as a complement
to police work).
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II. THE INFORM-LATIVE FUNCTION OF LITIGATION
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan accused the Court majority
of "weaponizing the First Amendment" after it overturned a prior case that
had stood for over forty years.2 So, too, might the Second Amendment be
weaponized to alter the legal landscape for firearm regulations at the federal,
state, and local levels. With the PLCAA blocking impact litigation that would
have the potential to regulate firearms, Second Amendment constitutional
litigation is the new courtroom battleground. And this litigation will certainly
have a significant impact on the future of gun control. Parts of the judiciary,
including some justices, are focused primarily on the scope of the right and
historic analogues," but litigation provides a chance to inform them of the
role the law plays in this growing public health crisis.
Public health research and law, therefore, must play a critical role in
the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence.124 Constitutional litigation
provides an avenue to provide useful data relevant to the judiciary's legal
analysis and may influence their ultimate conclusions. For example, when
discussing amicus briefs, Justice Breyer stated that "[s]uch briefs play an
important role in educating judges on potentially relevant technical matters,
helping to make us not experts but educated laypersons and thereby helping
to improve the quality of our decisions."2 The public health community,
and experts in technical aspects of statistics and epidemiological principles,
would be an excellent resource to convey emerging research on gun violence
and the law in a manner that is easily understandable. Moreover, they can
do so with credibility that the judiciary respects and appreciates. While the
exact influence on an outcome may be incalculable, there is no doubt that
amicus briefs, in particular, can provide important and relevant information
that may not be well-represented or represented at all in the arguments
put forth by the parties.
122 Janus v Am. Fed'n of State, Cty, & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018). For
more on how First Amendment interpretations impact public health directly see Yale
Law School Conference, Public Health in the Shadow of the Fir/ Amendment YALE L. SCH.
(Oct. 7, 20 14), https://lawyale.edu/yls-today/news/yale-law-school-hold-conference-
first-amendment-shadow-public-health, and the accompanying symposium on
Balkanization from the Public Health in the Shadow of the First Amendment Conference (2014),
https: / /lawyale.edu/ghjp/events /past-events-archive /guest-bloggers-balkinization-
public-health-shadow-first-amendment-conference (last visited Aug. 18, 2020).
123 See supra Part LB.ii.
124 See Ulrich, supra note 4, at 1096-98.
125 Justice Breyer Calls fir Experts to Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 17, 1998),
https: / /wwwnytimes.com/ 1998/02 / 17/us /justice-breyer-calls-for-experts-to-aid-
courts-in-complex-cases.html.
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The judiciary's role is to decide cases and controversies brought
before them. But the impact of these decisions, particularly appellate and
Supreme Court opinions which control lower courts, can be far-reaching.2
Yet it is rational to think judges may, at times, be blinded by the narrow focus
of the facts and legal theory before them in a particular case. It can often be
useful to present a broader perspective on what their decision might mean
to society.1 ' According to Judge Posner, "appellate lawyers would be more
effective if . . . they instead emphasized the practical stakes in the case and
thus the consequences of the decision."128 Third parties may present the
judiciary with a broader view of the litigation's impact.1 "
This is not to suggest that social science, storytelling, or historical
contextualizing will always sway a court. To be sure, there are stories of
judges disregarding, if not misunderstanding, the briefs they read."' For
example, while Justice Brennan cited scientific studies quite often in his
opinions, he was not immune to misinterpretations." In Craig . Boren,Justice
Brennan found a disparity between male and female drivers for driving
under the influence of alcohol to "hardly ... form the basis for employment
of a gender line as a classifying device. Certainly, if maleness is to serve as
a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered
an unduly tenuous 'fit." 1 2 Yet there was no correlation involved, and the
discrepancy was hardly trivial." As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent,
the discrepancy was higher by a factor of nearly eighteen."
126 See e.g infra Part ILA (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, Grutter c. Bollinger, and
icCiLesky v. Kemp).
127 See Linda Greenhouse, What Got Into the Court? What Happens Next?, 57 MAINE L. REV. 1,
6-8, 10 (2005) (discussing the importance of considering not simply pure legal doctrine
but how the opinions impact the real world).
128 Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1049, 1067 (2006). Professor Linda Sandstrom Simard has pointed out that 'Judge
Posner has been critical of the inefficiencies created by amicus briefs, noting that '[t] he
vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the
arguments made in the litigants' briefs .... ' Simard, supra note 12 at 681 (2008).
129 See Simard, supra note 12, at 680 (2008) ("[A]mici curiae may play ... an educational
role by presenting technical information that creates a fuller context for the court to
decide the case.").
130 See Blake, supra note 11, at 231.
131 Id
132 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1976).
133 Blake, supra note 11, at 231.
134 Craig, 429 U.S. at 223 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to Blake, Justice Brennan
makes three important mistakes. "First of all, there is no correlational analysis taking
place, so the term 'correlation' is not appropriate. Second, he mistakes the concepts
of statistical significance . . . for substantive significance .... Finally the substantive
significance of the difference in arrest rates for men and women is massive, not merely
VOL. 13, Iss. 1 199
Ulrich
A majority of judges at every level of the federal bench have stated
that amici curiae help "offer[] new legal arguments that are absent from the
parties' briefs" and may provide perspective on the impact by highlighting
"matters that extend beyond the parties' dispute."" This fact is consistent
with the notion that the judiciary can, and at times must, be educated on
critical information or perspectives. The Court's limitations may result from
a lack of expertise or understanding of a nuanced scientific matter, or it
may be from a lack of experience. The latter has almost certainly been key
throughout the history of the Court. Consider the representation of the
Court over its history, predominantly white males, as they have sought to
answer questions implicating the lives of people of color, women, and, more
recently, sexual minorities. In cases involving these three areas, outcomes
have been influenced by non-party involvement in the litigation, acting to
better inform the judiciary.
A. Race
Perhaps the most well-known example where a case's outcome
may be credited to the research and data used to inform the judiciary is
Brown z. Board of Education." In the majority opinion, footnote eleven cites
social science research to support the notion that school segregation causes
psychological harm to Black students."' Many have questioned both the
validity of the research cited in Brown and whether the Court relied on that
research to reach its conclusion," yet those questions do not necessarily
'not trivial."' Blake, supra note 11, at 231. Justice Rehnquist, despite citing science in
less than one percent of his opinions, correctly made note of this in his dissent in Craig
a. Boren, finding male drivers eighteen to twenty years old were arrested for driving
under the influence nearly eighteen times as often as females in the same age group.
Id at 232.
135 Simard, supra note 129, at 690-92. For the educational function of providing new
legal arguments, all Supreme Court respondents supported this function, as did 77.10%
of Circuit Court respondents and 82.5,% of District Court respondents. Id. at 690.
Professor Simard provides an example using Alapp v. Ohio. Id. at 691. In the case,
the Supreme Court agreed with the argument made by the ACLU, acting as amicus
curiae, who urged the Court to overturn prior precedent, an argument absent from the
appellant's challenge. Id. Moreover, all Supreme Court respondents, along with 73.7%
of judges on federal appellate courts and 72.7% of those on federal district courts,
supported "focus [ing] the court's attention on matters that impact a direct interest that
is likely to be materially impacted by the case." Id at 692.
136 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137 Id. at 494, n.11.
138 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinariy,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 294-95 (2005).
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diminish the importance of the role social science played. While the former
has the benefit of over sixty years of hindsight,"" the latter still represents the
fact that the Court felt this controversial decision might be more palatable
with scientific support."4
But Brown was certainly not the last race-centric case where
information outside of the parties' legal arguments made a lasting impression.
Grutter v. Bollinger was a highly visible affirmative action case involving
Michigan Law School and the use of race in its admissions process. " Some
commentators thought Grutter was the opportunity for the Court to overturn
its prior affirmative action case, Regents of California v. Bakke,1 2 but the Court
provided "an unapologetic embrace of a proposition that put affirmative
action on a stronger footing than Justice Powell's solitary opinion in Bakke."1
An amicus brief from "retired military officers and superintendents of the
military academies," among others, is credited with playing a central role in
this surprising outcome.1"
The brief's impact was evident early, becoming a prominent feature
at oral argument with the Justices using it as the basis for questions to
the solicitor general.15 Importantly, the brief was not simply focused on
whether the use of race-preference programs was constitutional. Rather, the
brief examined the legally relevant issue of whether the affirmative action
policies could help the academies fulfill their purposes. 16 This brief, along
139 Id at 296.
140 See id. at 293-94; see also Sanjay Mody Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social
Science and the Supreme Court's Questfor Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 793, 794 ("The Court
... embraced the footnote eleven studies to lend authority to its highly controversial,
and legally precarious, decision to strike down public school segregation.").
141 See generally Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
142 See Greenhouse, supra note 127 at 5-6.
143 Id Greenhouse continues by stating that the decision recognized that "diversity serves
a compelling state interest not only as an educational tool for enriching life in the
classroom ... but as a pathway for full participation by members of minority groups in
the civic and economic life of the country" Id.
144 Id at 6. See also Sylvia H. Walbot & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs Revisited, 33
STETSON L. REv. 171, 173 (2003) ("[W]ithout question a powerful influence in the
case[ was the single amicus brief of 'the military' as it came to be informally called.").
145 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 228
(2007) ('Amicus briefs are rarely mentioned in Supreme Court arguments, but four
justices had referred to the military in the first several minutes of Grutter."); see also
Greenhouse, supra note 127, at 6 ("It was clear during the argument that the Justices
had read [the military] brief .... "); Walbot & Lang, supra note 144, at 175. For a
broader discussion of the impact of "the military's" amicus brief, see ToOBIN, supra, at
224-36.
146 See Walbot & Lang, supra note 144, at 175. See also Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein,
Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Tears, 89 JUDICATURE 127, 131 (2005) (describing how
VOL. 13, Iss. 1 201
Ulrich
with the many others filed in support of affirmative action policies, provided
the Court with "an ingredient that was crucial to the outcome of the case: a
sense of the culture." 147 Justice Ginsburg later singled out the military brief
as "one of the most valuable briefs . .. submitted.""1 4
People of color are underrepresented at every level and in every
branch of governance. Social science and amicus briefs alone will not ensure
they are appropriately represented or that they will receive the justice they
seek. In fact, McClesky v. Kemp demonstrates the Court's most explicit rejection
of social science. 141 The case challenged the State of Georgia's death penalty
sentence against Warren McClesky, a Black man charged with killing a
white police officer, by demonstrating empirically the systemic bias in death
sentences if there is a white victim instead of a Black victim.5 0 Ultimately,
the majority rejected the claim because the data did not prove discrimination
in the plaintiffs case,"1 though there is evidence the real reason for ignoring
the data may have been a reluctance to create a precedent for evaluating
racial disparities in a severely biased criminal justice system."
Yet a lack of universal success in educating the Court does not
mean it cannot be effective. While the Justices almost certainly realize their
decisions have a broad impact on society, it may be difficult for them to keep
that impact at the forefront of their mind. By expanding the scope of the
issue, briefs, such as the military brief in Grutter, can help to emphasize that
a case is not simply one of legal theory. It is imperative that the judiciary, in
particular often the last vestige of hope for justice be acutely aware of
the O'Connor opinion cited the military brief for the position that "diversity in the
military is 'essential' for it to 'fulfill its principle mission to provide national security."').
147 Greenhouse, supra note 127, at 7. More specifically Greenhouse notes the connection
to what Robert Post refers to as "the constitutional culture in which the Court is
operating" with culture referencing "beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors." Id. at 7,
n.13. "[T] he Court in fact commonly constructs constitutional law in the context of an
ongoing dialogue with culture, so that culture is inevitably (and properly) incorporated
into the warp and woof of constitutional law" Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HxRv. L. REv. 1, 8 (2003).
148 Simard, supra note 12 at 696.
149 See generally McClesky v Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
150 Id at 283, 286-87 ("[E]ven after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants
charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as
defendants charged with killing blacks.").
151 Id at 292-93.
152 See Erwin Chemerinsky Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The
Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SAA, CLARA L. REv. 519, 527-28 (1995) (quoting
Justice Scalia in a memo to the Conference of Justices) ("Since it is my view that
unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon
jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions
of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof.").
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the practical effect communities of color will endure after the legal academy
has moved on to the next big case.
B. Sex
Sex-related legal questions are particularly interesting given the
progression of women's status in society and the makeup of the Court. The
relevance of social science influencing Supreme Court decisions is often
traced to the famous brief filed by Louis Brandeis 3 in the case of Muller
v. Oregon.15' On the heels of Lochner v. New ork," which rejected protective
labor laws for bakers, there was a question of how the Court would handle
protective labor laws for women.156 The Brandeis brief contained 111 pages
of "new empirical evidence" as compared to a mere two pages of legal
arguments."1 Ultimately, the Court found this information persuasive and
upheld the restrictions on women's work hours."
While arguments that employers should treat male and female
workers differently seems misogynistic now and sexist assumptions likely
played a role as well" 3 -the reliance on social science rather than legal
theory did prove successful."' Moreover, the evolving data corrects the
mistaken understanding of female fragility and the need for paternalistic
protection. If anything, research is often likely to evolve much more quickly
than public sentiment and, therefore, gives us a better chance of correcting
past decisions. A reliance on past precedent and legal theory would make
it more difficult for the underrepresented in particular, people of color,
153 See Blake, supra note 11, at 219 ("The conventional account of social science influencing
Supreme Court decisions typically begins with the 'Brandeis Brief' in Muller v. Oregon.").
154 Muller v Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
155 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
156 Perhaps important to Brandeis's strategy in Muller was Justice Harlan's dissent in
Lichner, which recognized the liberty of contract but stated that it may be limited due
to the dangerous working conditions and health impact faced by bakers. Id. at 70-71
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Blake, supra note 11, at 220. The New York Attorney General
in Lochner failed to raise these concerns and, instead, the Court deferred to legislative
judgments about a state's use of police powers. Id. at 221.
157 Blake, supra note 11, at 220.
158 Muller, 208 U.S. at 419, 422-23.
159 SeeJudith Glans Brown, Lucy A. Williams & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, The Mythogenesis
f Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN's LJ.
457, 470 (1996) ("Muller's holding that legislation limiting hours for women was
constitutional rests on 'facts' (myths) about women workers that differentiated them
from male workers, thereby avoiding the conundrum that, if men had a constitutional
right to labor in an unregulated economy women should enjoy the same 'right."').
160 Muller, 208 U.S. at 419-22 (mentioning Brandeis's brief before describing the
justifications for upholding the law).
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women, and sexual minorities to gain greater access to justice.
Another example can be found in the abortion context. Abortion
rights suffered a crucial blow in Gonzales z. Carhart, where the Court
essentially reclassified the undue burden test as a rational basis evaluation."6
Perhaps influenced by a pro-life brief that described women having adverse
emotional and psychological effects from undergoing an abortion, the
Court validated the government's concern for women's mental states.16 2
With echoes of Muller, the Court stated: "While we find no reliable data
to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained."16 3
In an abortion case to follow, Whole Woman's Health o. Hellerstedt,1 6'
abortion rights advocates countered this unsubstantiated claim with more
than 100 female lawyers, law students, law professors, and former judges
filing a brief explaining why abortion was the right decision for them and
why it helped them achieve their position within the legal field."16 This brief
used a very specific group of women "inside the Justices' rhetorical circle" to
161 Gonzales v Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158, 166 (2007) ("Where it has a rational basis to
act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to
bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests
in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life
of the unborn."). Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent what an incredibly low bar
the majority sets for their evaluation: "Today's ruling, the Court declares, advances
'a premise central to [Casey's] conclusion' i.e., the Government's 'legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.' ... But the Act scarcely
furthers that interest: The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets
only a method of performing abortion." Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit relied on this when declaring "the
first-step in the analysis of an abortion regulation, however, is rational basis review, not
empirical basis review" Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. N.
Abbott, 748 E3d 583, 596 (5th Cir. 2014).
162 See Linda H. Edwards, Hearing T ices: Non-Party Stories in Abortion and Gay Rights Advocacy,
2015 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1327, 1343 (2015). The brief was particularly critical of prior
abortion jurisprudence, which it claimed "made non-evidence based assumptions,"
whereas this brief provided real life experiences. Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former
"Mary Doe" of Doe r. Bolton, & 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 2, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380) [hereinafter Cano
Brief]. Despite the implicit claim that this brief was based on evidence, there is no
description of the sources or methodologies that produced the affidavits included from
the women, nor do the affidavits provide information on what led to the women having
abortions. See Edwards, supra, at 1344.
163 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Cano Brief).
164 Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
165 Linda H. Edwards, Telling Stories in the Supreme Court: Vices Briefs and the Role of Democracy
in Constitutional Deliberation, 29 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 29, 30-32 (2017).
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counter the narrative that women needed the government or the judiciary
to protect them from making poor decisions."'
This brief helped to contextualize the case by reframing the issue
before the Court. In Whole Woman's Health, Texas claimed the regulations
were meant to protect the health and wellbeing of women by increasing the
safety of abortion procedures."' But the opposition brief filed by women
challenged the notion that they needed such paternalistic regulations that
offered restriction with no protection, thus providing an avenue for the
Court to focus on the merits of the claim instead of simply deferring to
State authority.6 Indeed, what is "undue" requires a close examination of
the facts on the ground."1 6
This opened the door for other amici to provide critical facts
about the burden the Texas laws created while providing no benefits. For
example, research demonstrated that abortion procedures were safer and
had lower mortality rates than procedures that were not subject to the
regulations, raising questions as to why the regulations applied only to
abortion procedures."" Moreover, as Justice Breyer noted in his majority
opinion, when complications do arise, they occur well after the procedure,
making the necessity of the admitting privileges requirement doubtful."'
While providing little to no benefit, the evidence established to the Court
the drastic increase in burdens on women, especially considering that the
provider closures forced under the regulations drastically increased the
distances needed to travel to obtain an abortion."' This information led
the Court to strike down the Texas regulations"3 in an opinion filled with
data that gave specific details on the burdens and, importantly, the lack of
benefits for the women of Texas.1 7 4
166 Id at 31. "It's the Justices' community it's their colleagues and people who have
argued before them and former law school classmates and co-clerks." Id (citation
omitted) (quoting Ruth Marcus, In a Supreme Court Brief, Lawyers Bravely Tell Their Own
Stories, WASH. PosT Jan. 26, 2016), https://wwwwashingtonpost.com/opinions/in-a-
supreme-court-brief-lawyers-tell-their-own-abortion-stories/20 16/01/26/1 9c4 1Ofa-
c457-1 1e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html).
167 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
168 See Edwards, supra note 165, at 31-33.
169 Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Wbman Makes: Protection fir the
Abortion Right After Whole Woman's Health, 126 YALE L.J.E 149, 154 (2016).
170 See Whole bmen's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315.
171 See id. at 2311.
172 See id at 2313.
173 Id at 2318-19, 2320.
174 Id at 2311-14; see also Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 169, at 156 ("The Court's
decision is rich with factual findings of the district court and of amici that bear on the
balance of benefits and burdens in the case.").
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C. Sexual Orientation
Likewise, the evolution of gay rights in the Supreme Court owes
significant credit not simply to new constitutional interpretation but to a
broader understanding of the context in which that legal analysis takes
place. In Bowers o. Hardwick, a decision that has since been overruled on the
basis that it was "not correct when it was decided,"" the Supreme Court
upheld a Georgia sodomy law" 6 because the Constitution, including the
right to privacy, does not extend to "homosexual sodomy.""' The Court
declared that prohibitions of this conduct have "ancient roots," precluding
status as a fundamental right."' The Court went on to uphold the law under
rational basis review, despite acknowledging that it was grounded in notions
of morality" rather than the need to protect public health, safety, or welfare.
But the assumptions made about the historical treatment of gays by
"Western civilization," as Justice Burger noted in his concurrence,1 "O were
later shown to be inaccurate. The briefs in Lawrence o. Texas were critical
of the faulty logic upon which Bowers relied.81 Briefs written by professors
of history, and by organizations led by the Human Rights Campaign,
focused on the historical treatment of gay people to undercut the Bowers
assumptions."12 They also used social science research to explain stigma,
internalized psychological harm, and the gay community's exposure to
violence.183 It went on to demonstrate that the gay community does not
conform to stereotypes and caricatures, but in fact, is quite diverse in their
demographics and lived experiences.18' Meanwhile, a brief filed by Yale law
professor Harold Koh provided the Court with updated legal developments
in other Western countries to counter the narrative in Bowers that gay sexual
practices garnered near-universal rejection.185 The brief stated that "'foreign
and international courts have barred the criminalization of sodomy between
175 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
176 Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
177 Id at 190, 196.
178 Id at 192.
179 Id at 196.
180 Id at 196-97 (Burger,J., concurring).
181 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-71 (2003) (citing briefs of amici curiae
the ACLU, et al.; the Cato Institute; and Professors of History et al.).
182 Greenhouse, supra note 127, at 8.
183 See Edwards, supra note 162 at 1346.
184 See Amicus Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al. in Support of Petitioners at 19,
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
185 Greenhouse, supra note 127, at 8.
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consenting adults"' in South Africa, Israel, Columbia, and the European
Court of Human Rights."
These briefs demonstrate the manner in which the Court can be
updated on an evolving understanding of the gay community. In the fight
for gay rights, briefs have been used to demonstrate the similarities between
same-sex couples and different-sex couples."' For example, studies have
been used to dispel the notion that children of same-sex parents are more
likely to be harmed than children of different-sex parents."" The data used
in these studies is not only about who those in the gay community are as
people, such as psychological or personality characteristics but also how they
value intimate relationships." "
Research has also been critical to illustrate more tangibly the harm
that seems so evident from discriminatory treatment. Sexual minorities suffer
from disparities in mental health that are no longer seen as part of their
sexual identity.9" Instead, it is now clear that it is, in fact, the marginalization
and social stigma they endure that has perpetuated health inequities, as well
as stressors that put them at increased risk for physical health disparities.11
Evidence of damage was then demonstrated to extend to the children
of same-sex parents. Again, these children suffered harm not because they
had same-sex parents but, instead, because of societal discrimination these
families faced. At oral argument for Hollingsworth . Peny, which concerned
California's Proposition 8 ban on same-sex marriage, it became clear that
there was a need to explain the difference between these conclusions to the
Court." 2 During oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts believed there was
an inherent tension between the claims that children of same-sex couples
were no less "healthy" than children of heterosexual couples but that the
children of same-sex couples were harmed by denials to marriage.193 But a
186 Profs Koh and Jishini Submit Brief to Supreme Court on Lawrence v. Texas, YALE L. SCH. (Jan.
22, 2003), https://lawyale.edu/yls-today/news/profs-koh-and-yoshino-submit-brief-
supreme-court-lawrence-v-texas.
187 See Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, "Playing It Safe" With Empirical Evidence:
Selective Use of Social Science in Supreme Court Cases About Racialustice and Marriage Equality,
112 Nw. U. L. REV. 1565, 1576-77, 1583-84 (2018).
188 Id at 1576-79.
189 Id at 1578.
190 See id. at 1579.
191 Id
192 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 61-62, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693
(2013) (No. 12-144); see also Robinson & Frost, supra note 187, at 1576 (discussing oral
argument in Hollingsworth).
193 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 61-62, Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. 693 (No. 12-144).
During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts made it clear he believed there to be an
inconsistency: "[I] t seems to me that your position that you are supporting is somewhat
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brief for the case helped by successfully highlighting the voices of children
while integrating legal theory and social science data to demonstrate that
these two stances are not mutually exclusive.""
The evidence of damage was not featured as significantly or
explicitly in major gay rights opinions as compared to evidence of sameness,
but it seems likely that both were influential in the Court's evolution.
Obergefell . Hodges-the case recognizing the right to same-sex marriage
was primarily focused on the fact that heterosexual and same-sex couples
find marriage essential for similar reasons and, therefore, marriage of same-
sex couples deserves equal protection."" But there are references to the harm
of exclusion as well. For the children of same-sex couples "suffer the stigma
of knowing their families are somehow lesser . . . [and] [t]he marriage laws
at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples."""
For the adults denied the privilege of marriage, Justice Kennedy held that
the law "demeans" them and "disrespect[s] and subordinate[s] them."""
The fight for marriage equality was an important step, but certainly
not the end of the search for equality. In this regard, many civil rights
battles share a common thread. They demonstrate both the promise of
educating the judiciary through social science and the limitations. Far too
often, the narrow legal arguments provide narrow understandings of the
underrepresented.1 118 The right to a marriage license does not eliminate the
number of other barriers that sexual minorities continue to face. Likewise,
increased access to Michigan Law School does not address the vast number
of structural barriers people of color face starting in the womb.
But these cases provide an opportunity for change. And these
areas of law exhibit the manner in which the Court can be informed and
influenced in a way that enhances the Justices' thought process. In writing
for the Obergefell majority,Justice Kennedy explicitly referenced the evolving
understanding of the gay community: "the argument that gays and lesbians
had a just claim to dignity was in conflict with both law and widespread
internally inconsistent. We see the argument made that there is no problem with
extending marriage to same-sex couples because children raised by same-sex couples
are doing just fine and there is no evidence that they are being harmed. And the
other argument is Proposition 8 harms children by not allowing same-sex couples to
marriage [sic]. Which is it?" Id.
194 Edwards, supra note 162, at 1347.
195 Obergefell v Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665-66 (2015).
196 Id at 668.
197 Id at 672-676.
198 See also, e.g., Robinson & Frost, supra note 187, at 1581 ('Judges should make decisions
with a full understanding of LGBT people's lives, not just the slivers that lawyers
sometimes choose to serve up to them.").
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social conventions.""" Gone is the time when justice Powell, in deciding to
cast the decisive vote in Bowers . Hardwick, would tell his fellow justices that
he had never met a homosexual despite the fact that one of his clerks that
term was gay.20' Now, due in part to briefs that included substantial and
significant research, the Justices have a "sense that the culture ha[s] changed,
not only outside the Court, but within it." 2"1
These examples demonstrate how litigation can open the door
for an opportunity to expand the judiciary's view of what matters in a
constitutional analysis. These cases are important given the precedential
value appellate decisions can have, binding not only lower court judges but
policymakers as well. In the Second Amendment arena, where the Supreme
Court has made so few declarations, the Court must support future decisions
with a proper framing on the impact those decisions can and will have on
a country struggling to grapple with the growth of gun violence. Thus, gun
reform stakeholders should view future cases as a chance to explain how the
law can be a powerful tool in tackling gun violence.
199 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 660-61.
200 Adam Liptak, Exhibit A fr a Major Shift: Justices' Gay Clerks, N.Y TIMES (June 8, 2013),
https://wwwnytimes.com/20 13/06 /09/us/exhibit-a-for-a-major-shift-justices-gay-
clerks.htmlsmid=pl-share.
201 Greenhouse, supra note 127, at 8.
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III. CONSTITTIONAL, LITIGATION AS A PATH FOR EDUCATION
Given the evidence above that outside information can inform and
influence the judiciary, the public health community, public health research,
and public health law have essential roles to play in framing the future of
firearm regulations and Second Amendment jurisprudence. If the analysis
centers primarily around a search for historical analogues, the future of
gun violence will be dictated by what people centuries ago thought was a
proper method to reduce the harm of muskets. This would be inadequate.
Thankfully, constitutional litigation provides an opportunity to engage the
judiciary in the growing body of research assessing the connection between
the law and gun violence and the consensus that gun violence is one of
this country's most pressing public health issues. Moreover, public health
law demonstrates that the scope of the Second Amendment right is not the
end of a constitutional inquiry. As with all rights, the Constitution does not
provide absolute protection, and, in certain circumstances, the good of the
people can limit even the most protected fundamental rights.
A. The Role of Public Health
The role of public health research is vital for Second Amendment
cases because evidence suggests that justices are more likely to reference
scientific information in more prominent cases.202 And any Second
Amendment case would certainly qualify as prominent. Meanwhile, the
majority of Supreme Court clerks have stated that briefs with "social science
content merited special consideration."2 0' Thus, constitutional litigation is
a chance for public health research to highlight data that may not be at the
forefront of the judiciary's analysis when determining the scope of Second
Amendment protections. Indeed, this expert perspective is essential given
that research reveals that a brief from "a credible public interest or research
organization is much better positioned to provide social science findings
than a typical litigant." 204
Public health experts are in a unique position to fulfill this role. In
doing so, they can refocus the analysis on the state's ability to limit risk to
the public. Risk is not simply the probability of harm occurring, but the
magnitude of that harm as well. And while the Heller Court emphasizes the
202 Blake, supra note 11.
203 Kathleen E. Hull, The Role of Social Science Expertise in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 13
ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 471, 473 (2017).
204 Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20
J.L. & PoL. 33, 67 (2004).
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rights of "law-abiding citizens," a population perspective illuminates the fact
that lax gun laws increase the risk of harm, and it does so to more than just
the individual gun owner.205
To be sure, a state cannot necessarily predict when gun violence
will occur or from whom. But they do know that it will occur. And the more
guns that are prevalent in a community, the more likely that harm will occur.
This population-level perspective is necessary to counter the more prevalent
individual-level argument where a challenger is almost certain to argue that
they have not and will not misuse their firearm. But as any public health
professional knows, nobody expects the harm to happen to them until it
does. And while opponents of gun regulations may make that claim in
earnest, we know from data that arguments become escalated, emotional
outbursts occur, and dark moments of sadness or isolation can turn deadly
if guns are present.
The public health community has a role to play in conveying this
key information to the judiciary and to do so in an understandable manner.
In one of the few studies on the influence of amici curiae in federal courts,
the data found that a majority of federal judges, including all Supreme
Court justices who responded to the survey, indicated that the identity,
prestige, or experience of the amicus curiae was influential."' Public health
experts lend credibility to the research, as well as an ability to discuss what
the research does not say as much as what it does. Public health research is
not about causation, but more often correlation. Consequently, the research
is not meant to be dispositive of any legal query. Rather, it is informative of
the manner in which the law may have a reasonable chance to mitigate or
exacerbate gun mortality and morbidity.
This includes the fact that gun violence accounts for nearly 40,000
deaths annually.207 Estimates suggest another 100,000 or more individuals
sustain nonfatal injuries by firearms each year.208 With a majority of these
injuries sustained by people between fifteen and thirty-four years of age, the
205 Heller l, 670 E3d at 1284.
206 Simard, supra note 12; see also Nathalie Gilfoyle &Joel A. Dvoskin, AP-Ns Amicus Curiae
Program: Bringing Psychological Research to Judicial Decisions, 72 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 753, 753
(2017) ('Justice Harry Blackmun specifically noted in an opinion that the American
Psychological Association's (APA) amicus briefs informed and helped the Court in
arriving at its decisions.").
207 Web-Based Jnjury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS), supra, note 1. This was
the highest recorded account of gun deaths since the CDC began tracking the data
over fifty years ago. Sarah Mervosh, Nearly 40,000 People Died From Guns in US. Last Year,
Highest in 50 Years, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 18, 2018, at A 19.
208 Facts and Figures, U.C. DAVIS HEALTH, supra, note 3 (describing death statistics associated
with gun violence).
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chronic complications from these wounds will impact their remaining years.2 0
Emerging evidence shows that this chronic suffering can include previously
unknown harms, such as "neurological problems, kidney dysfunction, and
reproductive" complications stemming from lead poisoning from bullets
designed to explode inside the body and that are unable to be safely removed
during surgery.21 0
And yet these physical harms do not fully encompass the harms
being sustained. Those directly exposed to shootings who sustain no physical
injury suffer from issues such as trauma, post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and
depression.211 Survivor's guilt can be particularly harmful because it can
prevent survivors from seeking help.21 2 And with the increased gun violence
across the country and the corresponding media coverage especially for
mass shootings many are suffering from psychological effects even without
direct exposure to shootings.2" This includes a growing number of students
who report regular concerns that they may become victims of a shooting in
their school or community214
This data provides a broader, and certainly more accurate, depiction
of what gun violence truly is and the impact it is having across the country.
A mere nod to the state's interest to protect public safety hardly provides
the appropriate balance when considering the state's justification for firearm
regulations. The culture in which the courts make these Second Amendment
decisions is relevant: "[T]o the extent that a court views the substance of
constitutional law as, in part, dependent upon the outlook of nonjudicial
actors, it will exercise what Felix Frankfurter once called the 'awesome
209 A More Complete Picture, supra, note 3; see also Bindu Kalesan et al., The Hidden Epidemic of
Firearm Irjury: Increasing Firearm Irjury Rates During 2001-2013, 185 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
546, 546 (2017).
210 Melissa Chan, They Survived Mass Shootings. Years Later, the Bullets Are Still Trying to Kill
Them, TIME (May 31, 2019), https://time.com/longform/gun-violence-survivors-
lead-poisoning/. These complications can include neurological problems, kidney
dysfunction, and reproductive issues. Id.
211 See Sarah McCammom, The Unirjured Victims of the Virginia Tech Shootings, NPR (Apr. 14,
2017), https://wwwnpr.org/transcripts/523042249.
212 Patricia Mazzei & MiriamJordan, "You Can't Put It Behind Y'u": School Shootings Leave Long
Trail of Trauma, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2UYsb3C.
213 Sarah R. Lowe & Sandro Galea, The Mental Health Consequences of Mass Shootings,
18 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 62, 62-63 (2017).
214 PROTECTING THE NEXT GENERATION: STRATEGIES TO KEEP AMERICA'S KIDS SAFE
FROM GUN VIOLENCE, GIFFORDs L. CTR. 12 (2018), https://giffords.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/12/Giffords-Law-Center-Protecting-the-Next-Generation.pdf; see
also Liam Stack, 'I Think About It Daily': Life in a Time of Mass Shootings, N.Y TIMES (Dec.
3, 2015), https://wwwnytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/03/us/mass-shootings-
fear-voices.html (describing testimony from a fifteen-year-old: "I would say I think
about the possibility of a shooting in my life regularly.").
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power' of judicial review with some attention to the understandings of those
actors."215
The public health community is equipped with the skillset to properly
educate and frame the gun violence epidemic in a manner that is salient to
constitutional decisions. Moreover, as experts, they can describe the research
in a way that is approachable for the lay reader. This can help to avoid
mistaken understandings of the data. The information will contextualize the
case not only for the narrow interests of the challenger but also in terms of
how the ruling may exacerbate or mitigate gun violence and, given the rash
of media attention on mass shootings, influence the country's psyche as well.
As the great Supreme Court journalist Linda Greenhouse notes:
"[N]o great Supreme Court case is only a question of law It is always also
an episode in the ongoing dialogue by which the Court engages with the
society in which it operates and in which the Justices live." 216 In the time
of Dayton, El Paso, Orlando, Virginia Tech, and Parkland, among many
others, the notion that public health research has anything to teach the
Court about gun violence may seem implausible. But a glance at remarks
made by justices about Second Amendment rights and gun violence suggests
the need for influence from the public health community is urgent.
Six days after the Parkland shooting, Justice Thomas issued a
dissent from a denial of certiorari for a case upholding California's ten-
day waiting period where he declared the Second Amendment the Court's
"constitutional orphan."21 Seeking to stifle what he deemed to be lower
courts' "defiance," Justice Thomas made it clear that he intends to limit the
judiciary's ability to uphold even regulations that do little more than make an
individual wait ten days for their firearm.21 Such an approach may amount
to deregulation of firearms across the country and the weaponization of
the Second Amendment against future gun control measures. As the deaths
from firearms continue to climb, this is certainly a public health problem
that warrants perspectives from experts in population-based analysis.
B. The Role of Public Health Law
Providing current public health data on gun violence is not simply to
help the judiciary appreciate the cultural evolution of society's relationship
with guns. The data must be accompanied by an explanation for why this
215 Post, supra note 147, at 7.
216 Greenhouse, supra note 127, at 2, 7.
217 Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas,J., dissenting from the Court's
denial of certiorari).
218 See id. at 951.
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data is necessary for a thorough constitutional analysis. The focus on the
scope of Second Amendment protections has the potential to cast a shadow
over the state's compelling interest in protecting public health and safety.
But public health law experts can more accurately demonstrate that even
fundamental rights can be limited in the name of public health and safety.2
The question is whether there is sufficient justification to limit those rights,
the degree to which those rights are limited, and whether the benefits to
the public are sufficient in relation to those limitations.22 A proper analysis
of these considerations almost invariably requires more than a simple
categorical approach. Rather, it requires evaluating data if it is available.
Public health law is a constantly developing field that reflects
the changes in our understanding of public health outcomes and the
mechanisms that influence them. Gun violence was hardly seen as a public
health issue decades ago. Viewed more as random, tragic events that resulted
from criminal activity and unforeseeable accidents, it was difficult to argue
that gun violence was a public health problem that warranted public health
solutions. But now, thanks to social science research, we understand that gun
violence is not always sporadic and random and, instead, can be amenable to
proactive government solutions.2 This relatively new understanding is what
raises the question of when the government may limit Second Amendment
rights to protect public health and safety.
Take, for example, carrying firearms in public. When analyzing
the constitutionality of restrictions on carrying firearms in public, courts
should consider what lessons public health research has to offer. Shall-issue
concealed carry permit laws are significantly more lenient than may-issue
carry permit laws because they remove the discretion of the licensing
body to deny a license to a small portion of individuals meeting narrow
qualifying criteria. Shall-issue laws have been associated with higher rates
of firearm-related homicide and, importantly, handgun-specific homicide
in particular as compared to those states that have the stricter may-issue
regulations.222 While these correlation studies do not demonstrate causation,
219 SeeJacobson v Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 27-28 (1905).
220 Ulrich, supra note 4, at 1077-78.
221 See, e.g., Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Tragic, but Not Random: The Social Contagion of
Nonfatal Gunshot Irjuries, 125 Soc. Sct. & MED. 139, 148 (2015); Ben Green, et al.,
Modeling Contagion Through Social Networks to Explain and Predict Gunshot Violence in Chicago,
2006 to 2014, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 326, 331-32 (2017).
222 Michael Siegel et al., Easiness of LegalAccess to Concealed Firearm Permits and Homicide Rates
in the United States, 107 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1923, 1928 (2017) [hereinafter LegalAccess];
see also Michael Siegal et al., The Impact f State Firearm Laws on Homicide and Suicide
Deaths in the USA, 1991-2016: A Panel Study, 34J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 2021, 2021 (2019),
(finding that shall-issue laws are associated with a significant increase in the homicide
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the researchers found no increase in long-gun homicide rates, which lends
credence to the connection between the concealed carry laws and handgun
violence.23
The data also pushes back on the increasingly suspect claim that
more guns equate to less crime.2 24 If more guns result in less crime, "one
would expect to see lower handgun, nonhandgun, and nonfirearm homicide
rates in shall-issue states when compared with may-issue states."2 5 Yet this
simply was not what researchers found. The deterrent effect lacks empirically
supported credibility, as the older, minimal research supporting the claim
has been consistently contradicted with new research demonstrating the
opposite. These facts should be relevant to any legal analysis of restrictions
to carry firearms in public, but some courts are more apt to evaluate laws
from the 1700s than they are the most up-to-date research.
While originalism may have strong support within the judiciary, the
notion that states are limited in their efforts to combat the emerging gun
violence epidemic by founding era analogues misunderstands the nature of
police powers." Police powers authorize the state to act to protect public
health, safety, and welfare."' As threats to public health evolve and emerge,
so too must the state's ability to respond, both proactively and reactively,
to those threats.228 Just as the public would question the legitimacy of the
government if they failed to act during a contagious disease epidemic, so
too are many looking to their elected leaders for answers to the growing
threat of gun violence. The toolkit of policymakers cannot be limited to
an excavation of historical records to see how our founding fathers may
have responded, but instead must be grounded in empirical facts to support
narrowly tailored yet effective interventions.
The nascent Second Amendment jurisprudence is like a nearly
blank canvas with which the legal community can work. This raises the
stakes further for the need to ensure data-driven decisions that appropriately
factor in what public health research can teach us. But it is important to note
that this does not necessarily always mean the data will push in the direction
of restricting rights. As mentioned above, the Second Amendment rights
rate) [hereinafter State Firearm Laws].
223 LegalAccess, supra note 222, at 1928.
224 See Ian Ayres &John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the 'More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis,
55 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1285-86 (2003); Ian Ayres &JohnJ. Donohue III, Commentary,
More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again: The Latest Evidence from 1977-2006, 6 EcON. W ATCH
J. 218 (2009).
225 Legal Access, supra note 222, at 1928.
226 See Ulrich, supra note 63, at 194-98.
227 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
228 Ulrich, supra note 63, at 198.
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of felons and those deemed mentally ill are too easily extinguished even by
those who generally support individual rights.
In Moore o. Madigan," a case focused on carrying firearms in public,
Judge Posner felt compelled to discuss his lack of concern with not simply
limiting, but completely eliminating, the fundamental constitutional rights
of marginalized groups. In fact, he specifically states that data to support this
claim is unnecessary: 'And empirical evidence of a public safety concern can
be dispensed with altogether when the ban is limited to obviously dangerous
persons such as felons and the mentally ill."" This is contradictory to
empirical evidence suggesting the mentally ill are no more violent than
other citizens." But as previously noted, people with mental illnesses are
more likely to be victims of violence than perpetrators, which one would
think makes for a strong argument to protect their constitutional right to
self-defense. Therefore, an emphasis on the relevance of empirical data does
not invariably lead to a restriction of rights and, in some cases, can expand
Second Amendment protections.
229 Moore v. Madigan, 702 E3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012).
230 Id
231 Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T MacLeish, Mental Jllness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics
of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 241-42 (2015).
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CONCLUSION
This article is not meant to suggest that empirical evidence is
the answer to any and all constitutional questions. There may be many
circumstances where research is unavailable or data supports both sides of
an argument. Data can be manipulated, selectively used, and misleading to
an audience. In fact, there is strong evidence that social science is most often
used in a manner to protect the status quo.32 But the fact that data is not
controlling does not mean it cannot and should not be persuasive in certain
circumstances. And data misuse only strengthens the argument that public
health experts should be more heavily involved in the interpretation and
presentation of emerging empirics on gun violence.
The judiciary's role in determining Second Amendment rights
cannot, and should not, be isolated from the gun violence controversy playing
out in public and political fora. The judiciary is inherently entangled in the
"culture wars" that divide this country." But to recognize their role in this
debate does not mean their decisions must be politically based. The judiciary
can lead, and often has led, the country through contentious battles, often
by relying on an evolving understanding informed through social science.
Data has by no means helped the judiciary solve all the problems faced
by underrepresented groups such as people of color, women, and sexual
minorities. But outside education of the judiciary has helped courts better
understand these groups and the impact judicial decisions have on their lives
and wellbeing. In that regard, improvement became possible.
Gun violence is a growing plague in this country and one that the
Supreme Court, along with the rest of the judiciary, will play a central role
in addressing. Though the most recent Supreme Court case was essentially
dismissed, another will soon be on the docket with all eyes watching closely.
A more informed Court will provide a more thorough analysis. And an
evidence-based decision, whatever the result, will be more palatable and
hopefully lead the country in recognizing that protection of constitutional
rights and the public are not mutually exclusive ends that we are forced to
choose between.
232 See, e.g., Robinson & Frost, supra note 187, at 1576-77, 1583-84.
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